Ontologicial questions

Traditionally Science is concerned with regularities.  Thus observations of individual events or occurrences are important only to the extent that the occurrence of such an individual event is the basis for the falsification of a claim about regularities.  This attitude pervades the worldview of Science 1.

Within the Science 1 context, the answers to questions of "why?" concern the placement of regularities (observed or conjectured) within an overall schema of regularities.  The relevant questions seem to be those of order and of fit.  Thus both further descriptions of regularities within an ordered regime (functional explanation) and measurements of adherence to a "pure" (non-contingency messed with) regularity are both offered and accepted as "explanatory".  The "how?" question which is implied by the "why?" questions is "how does this fit within the established order?"  -- where the answer to "why?" is a mechanism for how fit happens.

Some of the unarticulated assumptions in the Science 1 worldview are the pre-given-ness of an established order, the idea that there "should" be fidelity to that order, that the correct granularity for inquiry is that at the level of regularities, and that regularities can be referred to adequately by labels and models.    Given these assumptions it is reasonable to eliminate contingency with a further claim of Ceteris Paribas, to treat "fit" as measurable, to rely on noun forms, and to posit "truth" as a justificatory variable.   While each of these "reasonable" approximations can be discarded in the pursuit of "better explanation," our human cognitive limits and our reliance on the "least action principle" allow us to simplify "why?' explanations in the Science 1 world as category membership questions and allows  a pragmatic scientific realism to guide the articulations of the abbreviated worldview which results.